














The recent ‘cultural turn’ in the social sciences has led some writers to rethink the relationship between culture and economy.​[2]​ The term ‘cultural economy’ tries to outline the ways in which the economic is inseparable from the cultural.​[3]​ The term refers to how cultural meanings and identities are embedded in the economic life. We cannot explain how economic practices are coordinated without understanding the actors’ interpretations and the meanings behind their actions.
	This presentation of culture and economy is an improvement on previous approaches that privileged the economy over culture, or reduced cultural practices to economic structures, or treated the two as separate and unconnected entities. But this recent depiction of culture and economy has a fundamental limit: there is little interest in moral-political values. To be sure, the prioritisation of aesthetic values over moral-political values in recent studies of the cultural economy reflects the one-sidedness and a narrow conception of cultures.​[4]​ This article aims to correct this imbalance, and will suggest the ways in which the economy is embedded with moral values. Moral values concern how society should be organised, how others should be treated, our responsibilities to others, relationships with other species and the environment, and so on.​[5]​




The cultural economy approach


Increasingly contemporary writers argue that the economy has become ‘culturally stylised’, or aestheticised.​[6]​ By this, they mean two things. First, this tendency refers to how more cultural goods (music, literature, fashion, films, sport, etc.) are produced or mediated through the market. In particular, many writers (for example Adorno and Horkheimer or more recently Baudrillard and Featherstone) have spelled out the implications of this process by examining mass culture, mass consumption and fragmented identities.
	A second meaning refers to how production systems have become sensitive to the meanings people attach to work, and to the efficacy of reconstructing meaning at work. In particular, the writers on post-Fordism and corporate culture often claim that conflictual labour relations and arm’s length market relations have given way to a high degree of trust and embedded, negotiated processes of coordinating economic practices. It is also claimed that by constructing either an enterprise culture or a total quality management system in the organisation, economic relations and practices can become more personally fulfilling and enriching for workers, and productive and profitable for the company. 




A critique of the cultural economy perspective


While acknowledging the importance of ‘culture’ within the economy, and appreciating how cultural economy is an improvement on economic liberalism and traditional political economy, there are particular difficulties within the cultural economy perspective.
	The first weakness is that the cultural economy model uncritically accepts ‘the market’ as a central mechanism in the economy. The cultural economy model treats the public as the market, and the people as consumers. Yet we are not offered a political and moral critique of the market’s place in the economy – i.e., the effects of economic markets on human values and social practices. As we shall see later, the market mechanism, while appealing to individual needs, actually poses a threat to the individuality of those who inhabit the cultural economy terrain.
	The second weakness is that the model seems to suggest that a society that creates more cultural meanings and lifestyles is better than one in which there are less. So we are invited to assess the effects of globalisation by whether it adds to or subtracts from cultural diversity and aesthetics. Again, when considering fashion, we are supposed to ask whether it enables consumers to be active in creating their own identities. Yet trying to maximise meanings, lifestyles and aesthetics could be seen as morally suspect and unacceptable. For example, women in pornographic magazines can be described in terms of their beauty, youthfulness and attractiveness, but such images may be interpreted as degrading and dehumanising to women. Similarly well-dressed fascists preaching messages of ethnic intolerance and hatred may well be seen as morally repugnant.
	The third weakness concerns the methodology, which highlights the importance of contexts, identities and contingency. This literature also details how markets and organisations are socially constructed; that is, particular identities are not essential or fixed, but changing. While it contains within itself a much-needed corrective to traditional political economy, this methodological stance deliberately fails to identify any essential and necessary social relations and social tendencies, and shies away from any detailed abstract analyses (i.e., one-sidedness). Inevitably, such an anti-essentialist and firmly constructivist methodology produces studies that are more prone to mistakenly attributing causality, confusing is with ought, and failing to make critical interventions.​[8]​
	Let us examine some of the weaknesses in more detail. Market operations have implications for the individual’s identity, autonomy and desire for recognition. I will argue that cultural economy’s dependence on market systems undermines its project of autonomy for the individual, who desires recognition. We can identify three internal weaknesses of the cultural economy approach.
	Identity: according to the ‘cultural economy’ framework, identity revolves around leisure and centres on looks, images and consumption. It celebrates the market as it develops an autonomous character: as consumers, we can choose our own taste, and as entrepreneurs, we are responsible for our own success. The cultural economy highlights the playfulness of choosing our own identities at will from an array of market choices and opportunities.​[9]​
	Yet the market can undermine identity and personal character, because identity under market conditions tends to be unstable and subject to change: market incentives to act in particular ways are constantly changing. Individuals are no longer engaged in life projects, or fail to make long-term commitments, and so abandon deeper responsibilities (single issue protest movements for example). Autonomy requires settled commitments, values, life projects and responsibilities that define what it is to have a character. Under changing market conditions and incentives, such long-term commitments and deep responsibilities are discouraged.
	Authority and autonomy: autonomous people accept only that which they are able to affirm according to their own reasoning or experiences. Such a person appears most readily in the guise of the sovereign consumer and the individual entrepreneur, particularly in what has been called the ‘enterprise culture’.​[10]​ The cultural economy appeals to autonomous people who can use their own powers of judgement and decision to formulate projects and to make commitments: the individual does not depend on the authority of others. Authoritative standards in the product market (such as safety and quality standards for consumer goods) and labour markets (such as workers’ rights) are seen as incompatible with autonomy and freedom, and tend towards paternalism, elitism and a lack of individual responsibility. Here the sovereign self merges with the autonomous and responsible self.
	However, as John O’Neill in his book The Market: Ethics, Knowledge and Politics rightly argues, we can distinguish between social authority (authority conferred on a person, such as political and religious figures, on the basis of their institutional or social position), and epistemological authority (authority and knowledge arrived at through impersonal standards, dialogue and practical reasoning). While we can be suspicious of the former, the latter is both necessary and desirable in making reasonable judgements and decisions. Without authority, we are prone to making mistakes (e.g. ignoring the advice of our own doctor not to smoke and drink) that undermine our desire for autonomy.
	Recognition: recognition is required to confirm our self-worth as beings with powers of rationality and the capacity to stand above and shape particular desires. Yet recognition of worth and praise (or compliments) counts only from those other individuals whom we recognise to have worth. Recognition requires professional and trade associations, academic and scientific communities and craft guilds, whose recognition we respect as worth having. Recognition requires other people located in non-market institutions, and because of this we must reject an individualised market economy. 




The moral economy approach


Without an adequate moral framework to evaluate the cultural and economic, the cultural economy approach can be dismissed as simply a version of neo-liberalism, naively celebrating the false gods of market choices, individual autonomy, and value-neutrality.​[12]​ We shall evaluate the cultural economy approach by examining the moral economy approach (see Table 3), suggesting reasons why the latter is preferable to the former.
	A crucial feature of many of the goals or goods associated with culture is that they are primarily internal, i.e., intrinsic. For example, a certain kind of music might be valued, but this value is not accorded merely in order to achieve some external goal, but because the kind of music is valued in itself. By contrast, economic activities and processes involve a primarily instrumental orientation; they are ultimately a means to an end, satisfying external goals to do with provisioning. The meaningful aspects of activities, artefacts and relationships, whose value is primarily internal, are combined in various ways with instrumental activities directed towards the external goal of reproduction of social life. The internal association of the cultural and the economic implies that it is wrong to think of the relation between them as simply external. A question like ‘How has the economy been influenced by culture?’ implies that there was first a pristine economy which somehow later fell under the influence of culture, when of course economic activities have always been culturally embedded.
In the moral economy approach, cultures include values among their signifying practices. These may involve judgements and sentiments regarding utility, aesthetics and moral-political matters. Contemporary writers of the cultural economy approach are overly preoccupied with aesthetic values, as evident in their focus on style and taste; indeed the definition of their object of study refers to the ‘stylisation of life’.​[13]​  Yet there is less interest in moral-political values.
	For Sen, Habermas, Polanyi and other writers on the moral economy, central to the question of the relationship between culture and economy is that of the nature and role of moral-political values and the potential moralising and identity-neutral effects of the market.​[14]​ The tendency of neo-liberal theorists and cultural economy writers to reduce culture to the stylisation of life and private preferences is complicit in the de-moralisation of culture and de-rationalisation of moral-political values. There is a tendency to ignore moral influences on social life, usually by interpreting them either as merely subjective and emotive, or in instrumental, power-based terms, ‘strategies of distinction’, to use Bourdieu’s term.​[15]​ In order to counter these tendencies, a new version of the concept of moral economy is required that highlights the ways in which all economic activities – both formal and informal, or domestic – are influenced by norms and conventions, including ethical principles. The moral economy embodies norms, conventions, tacit understanding, and ‘constitutive rules’ regarding the responsibilities and rights of individuals and institutions with respect to others and regarding the nature and qualities of goods, services and environment. These norms, conventions and constitutive rules shape both the formal and informal, including household economies. It is worth noting that while these norms, conventions and constitutive rules may be considered as part of a moral order, they are invariably influenced by networks of power and considerations of costs.​[16]​
	The emergence of the market society has de-moralised society in another way. As Habermas and Sen point out, the development of economic systems (institutions characterised by formal rationality such as markets and bureaucracy) has turned questions of validity into questions of behaviour, and turned ethical and political questions into engineering and technical ones. The questions of purpose and ethics have become secondary to questions of fitness for purpose and techniques.​[17]​ Indeed, liberals and contemporary social theorists have usually depicted actors and institutions as merely instruments, generating wealth and producing a social order.​[18]​ In other words, the sphere characterised by formal rationality and impersonality dominates the sphere characterised by deliberation and negotiation. As Sayer argues, as people lost control over their economic lives (i.e., ‘vagaries of the market’), became alienated at work and from others, and came to have close economic relations with distant unknown others (i.e., advanced division of labour), the competitive laws of global economy tended to reduce the normative standpoints on moral economy, correspondingly making philosophical discourse on ethics appear irrelevant.​[19]​ However, we need to return to the questions of validity, ethics and purpose, otherwise we collude with the dominance of economic systems over the cultural sphere, condemning ourselves to the senseless truck, trade and barter mentality and to market fatalism.
	Sayer raises some issues of moral economy, validity, ethics and purpose that fundamentally question the nature of advanced industrialised societies.​[20]​ What are our responsibilities towards children, the elderly, the disabled and infirm, to distant others and future generations, and to the environment? How should we discharge our responsibilities to others? By paying taxes to fund transfer payments? Through direct unpaid labour? By paying others to do the work? How should these responsibilities be allocated between men and women, or between people of different incomes and wealth? To what extent should people be reliant on wages for their income? How far should income be subject to the anarchy of the market, or to the self-adjusting market? What things should not be commodified?




Concluding remarks: three dimensions of the moral economy


To strengthen the explanatory and critical claims of the moral economy approach, I will conclude by suggesting the different dimensions along which the economy is morally embedded: they are institutional, explanatory and normative.
	Institutional: the market society cannot be characterised as socially disembedded since markets require the construction of property rights, of contracts and their enforcement, and so on that enable them to operate. To depict the economy as a self-regulating market is to misconstrue the emergence and the development of the market society.​[21]​ To be sure, the moral reconstruction of the economy suggests that the provisioning of human beings is embedded in relations of justice. For example, members of families give gifts to one another based on their norms of deference and of reciprocal obligations between parents and children, and their religious beliefs. Members of a political community will adapt relations of distribution and of production to the norms and values of the community. For instance, a community that recognises the inequalities among its members will restructure economic relations differently to one in which freedom and liberty are highly valued.
	Explanatory: as Booth notes, economics as the science of wealth must be guided by the question of wealth’s purpose: wealth is an instrumental good, and it has a purpose external to itself, and in light of which its worth is judged.​[22]​ This claim, then, makes economics an ethical inquiry about the nature of the good life and about the place of the economy in relation to it. Consequently, economic science is incomplete if it fails to embed its studies of the economy in a wider cultural context. Economics must be centrally informed by the question of the good to which the economy serves. Significantly, this shifts us away from the liberal inquiry of rights, neutrality and self-ownership, towards a normative study grounded in questions like ‘To what purpose?’ and ‘What good is served?’ 
	In addition, according to Adam Smith and the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, markets have a ‘civilising effect’: reducing the power of the sovereign, and encouraging individuals and nations to be industrious and attentive to one another’s needs and to cultivate a reputation for fair dealing so as not to damage their credit-worthiness and market position.​[23]​ Similarly, Simmel argues that commerce is a powerful socialising and moralising agent that brings many non-material improvements to society, even though a bit of double-dealing may have to be accepted into the bargain.​[24]​






Economic liberalism	Marxist Political economy	Cultural economy
Basic focusPrivate economic interests and market freedom	Power relations in economic life	Culture and identity
Main figures/movementsAdam SmithNeo-classical economicsPublic choice theoryHayek	MarxLabour process theoryClass theoryGramsci	Weber, FoucaultPolitics of recognitionSocial constructionismBaudrillard
Key conceptsIndividual sovereigntySelf-interestRationalitySelf-regulating marketSpontaneous orderPrivate property rightsPrivate moralitySmall governments	Mode of productionSocial relations of production and exchangeProperty rightsCapitalismCommodification and decommodificationExploitation	Modes of representationDiscursive strategies of resistance and struggleConsumption and identityInterpretationsCultural symbolismNorms and conventions
Methodology Individualism, atomism empiricism and idealism	Essentialism, dialectics, abstractions, materialism and critical realism	Social constructionism, contingency, discourse analysis and narratives
Table 1 Comparison of the main approaches to economy and culture​[26]​

Weaknesses of economic liberalism and Marxist political economy	Strengths of cultural economy
Improvised interest-based view of economic action and the motivation of economic participantsInability to explain the normative basis of economic and social cohesion; indeed reduces this to interest and/or powerInability to demonstrate that economic interest is sufficient to generate changes in cultural practices as well as in economic and social life	Provides a deep understanding of the issues of meaning and motivation (i.e., the connections between meaning and economic action)Provides an analysis of the interpretative and symbolic basis of economic and social order, including tacit rules as well as explicit modes of political regulationEmphasises the order-transforming elements of culture at the personal, organisational, national and global levels





Deals with recognition and signifying practices	Deals with recognition and signifying practices
Basic FocusStylisation of life; aesthetic values; status, prestigious and positional goods, e.g. fashions, advertising, mass consumption, corporate culture, and identity at work	Moral implications, choice and regulation; rights and responsibilities; virtues and social relations, e.g. public service broadcasting, anti-pornography, business ethics, and moral obligations
Questions of behaviour, adapting to economic systems, e.g. enterprising self, consumer, public as market place, and neo-liberal US and UK neo-liberal workforce states	Questions of validity, asking what economic activities are for, e.g. citizenship, public sphere as democratic forum, civil society, and Nordic democratic welfare states
Playfulness of identities	Life projects, long term commitments and deep responsibilities
Sceptical of any authority	Distinction between social and epistemological authority
Love of display, praise and promotion, desire to be noticed	Love of praiseworthy acts, desire to be worthy of recognition
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